ductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts. OTHMAR F. ANDERLE, A Plea for Theoretical History IV, 27-56
Everywhere--even in Germany-the great specialization of historical research and its philosophical rationale, historicism or the cult of the particular, are bankrupt. A synoptic picture of the historical world is no less necessary than one of the natural world. To obtain it we must abandon the false dichotomy between nature and history; idiographic and nomothetic methods are applicable to both. Theories of history will not compromise man's free will. Historical theory might, like economic theory, identify structural elements in human relationships as well as non-historical factors which influence them.
RAYMOND ARON, Thucydide et Ie recit des evenements I, 103-128
International problems are not reducible to economic and social conjuncture. Thucydides therefore focuses on events, particular human acts performed freely chosen, and thus themselves irreducible to junctures of forces. No twentieth-century Thucydides could exist; no intelligible account of the wars of the present century could omit references to actors, but they would not be of central interpretative importance. Modern events are disindividualized, modem collective decisions numerous and complex. Thucydides nevertheless remains significant today to
III, 6-29
The Hempel-Popper dictum that causal explanations require hypotheses cast in universal form encourages bad generalizations. Generalizations relative to a context are more fruitful for the social scientist (even physical "laws" may be relative to such contexts as an expanding universe Benson: Certain logical principles govern explanations of human behavior: alleged causes must actually occur before their effects; men must be aware of events that allegedly affect them; explanations must jibe with generalizations about behavior and have intrinsic plausibility. Historians often neglect these principles. The best example is analysis of public opinion. Comparison of Thucydides with the historiography of the American Civil War shows both must assess public feeling on specific issues at a given time and place; but historians lack the tools to do this, and have recourse to dubious assumptions (such as that writers are the best reflection of public opinion). Sometimes even the principle of chronological priority is violated. Consistent application of the four logical principles above would at least narrow the range of potentially verifiable explanations and consequent disagreement. Strout: Specification of a "fundamental cause" of the Civil War or other events is best construed as a retrospective observation that the cited "cause" figures centrally in some reconstructed story. Historians explain through stories, narrations, which aim at comprehending the dramatic "logic" of a sequence of events rather than at scientific explanation. At worst general questions of causality are an irrelevant source of interminable disagreement, at best a stimulus to research, potentially resulting in a more coherent story and increased understanding. Causal accounts seem indispensable largely because explanations often involve purposes and reasons in causal disguise.
INDEX TO VOLUMES I-V sociology of knowledge, dealing with the relation between consciousness and society. Social structure is nothing but the result of human enterprise. Alienation--rupture between producer and product-leads to a false conscioUSness in neglecting the productive process. Reification, historically recurrent though not anthropologically necessary, while bestowing ontological status on social roles and institutions only sees society as producing men. Certain social conditions encourage de-reification. Philosophy and sociology, superstructures rooted in intersubjectivity, must co-operate in pursuing the sociology of knowledge.
ISAIAH BERLIN, History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History
History details the differences among events, whereas the sciences focus on similarities. History lacks the sciences' ideal models, whose usefulness varies inversely with the number of characteristics to which they apply.
As an external observer the scientist willingly distorts the individual to make it an instance of the general, but the historian, himself an actor, renounces interest in the general in order to understand the past through the projection of his own experience upon it. It is the scientist's business to fit the facts to the theory, the historian's responsibility to place his confidence in facts over theories.
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I, 1-31 WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA, Three Types of Historiography in PostRenaissance Italy IV, 303-314
Especially after 1530, Italy was so fragmented that a national historiography was impossible. Florence, Rome, and Venice were the chief regional centers. In Florence, the utility of history for the statesman was increasingly denied. Historians lacked self-confidence, and the republican tradition faded out in the excessive empiricism of Ammirato.
In Rome, the Counter-Reformation rejected the historiographical achievements of the Renaissance; historians were deflected from research into rhetoric and justification of the Church replaced disinterested inquiry. Only in Venice, formerly backward, did historiography thrive, perhaps in response to Venice's declining power. Venetian historiography was enriched by theories emanating from Padua and by close contact with political reality. Only Venice could have produced Sarpi.
JOHN BROOKE, Namier and Namierism III, [331] [332] [333] [334] [335] [336] [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] Namier's contribution to historiography, the techniques used in studying the lives of all members of parliament, can be compared to Galileo's use of the telescope. As the astronomer with more powerful instruments resolves such "constellations" as Andromeda, so the historical research team dissolves such specious classes as eighteenth-century "parties." For Namier, depth psychology, too, was essential to history as to all social sciences. At some point the historian must yield to the psychologist and sociologist; but some questions can be settled only by faith. Thus Namier's work (as he recognized) depreciates the value of history.
PETER BURKE, A Survey of the Popularity of Ancient Historians, 1450-1700 V, 135-152
Analysis of editions of classical historians-both in original and vernacular languages-as given in F.L.A. Schweiger's Handbuch der classischen Bibliographie, indicates variations in taste for models of historical writing. Many more Roman than Greek historians were reprinted: Sallust was the most popular author, but almost all the Romans were reprinted more often than any of the Greeks. National preferences (e.g., for Tacitus's Germania in Germany) can be seen in statistics of vernacular editions arranged by place of publication. Scholarly readers (using editions in original languages) show a different pattern of preference. Introductions to editions often reveal the social groups to whom the book is expected to appeal, and show qualities particularly admired (e.g., Polybius for historical explanation). Toynbee was not a faultless practitioner of his empirical methodology, but his concepts of evidence, verification, and law are adequate in principle. Toynbee's affirmation of a tough-minded metaphysical doctrine of free will, however, has the result that aU "evidence" for historical laws is only presumptive and that no laws can ever be established. Since the doctrine may be treated as an excresence upon Toynbee's theory of history, the indeterminist and antinomian should ignore or reformulate it in assessing Toynbee's conclusions.
HARRY ECKSTEIN, On the Etiology of Internal Wars IV, 133-163 "Internal war" is a resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or politicies; it is the genus of which revolution, uprising, Jacquerie, etc., are the species. The historical literature on the causes of internal wars is chaotic because historians have simply produced facts about any aspect of pre-revolutionary society which intuitively seemed significant. The real significance of these facts can only emerge from broader comparative studies. Such studies should be focussed on the preconditions of internal war rather than the (inevitably unique) precipitants and on changes in the elite holding power. Obstacles to internal wars must also be considered. Only a theory comprehending both positive and negative forces will prevent piling up of unrelated ad hoc theories and unhistorical disregard for special forces in particular cases.
ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, Clio and Chronos: of History-Book Time Some Aspects V, Bei. 6, Uncertainties about the relation of the present to the past reflect our inability to order coherently the accelerating accumulation of information about the past within a conception of temporal development which originated with the permanence of printed books and records. The orally transmitted memory of events was achronic; succeeding scribal culture, aware of the decay and loss of manuscripts, correspondingly believed in historical decline and in catastrophic and cyclical theories of historical change. The appearance of printed books and records gave rise to uniform time scales, transformed the sense of temporal location, fostered belief in the straight-line direction of history leading to the revolution of the "presentt but also has concealed from historians the extent to which their conceptions and. problems reflect a cumulative print-made culture.
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KLAUS EPSTEIN, Stein in German Historiography V, 241-274
Stein's career, though relatively devoid of popular appeal, has been the subject of much historical writing which shows the changing preoccupations of German historians, but which also shows some progress in understanding. Claims that Stein's personality was unproblematical, that he drew his main inspiration from the French Revolution, or that all was well with Prussia in 1806 once made by distinguished historiansare now discredited. Stein's weakness in foreign affairs and the archaism of his outlook are generally recognized. Ritter's biography, one of the greatest in the German language, will probably stand, with room for monographs on neglected details.
M. 1. FINLEY, Myth, Memory, and History IV, 281-302
Aristotle and other Greeks contrasted history and poetry because epic poetry or myth was an alternate way of apprehending the past. Myth was accepted as no less factual than history, being distinguished by its lack of any coherent dating scheme. Even Herodotus and Thucydides could not write a true history of early Greece; they were necessarily confined to contemporary history. The problem is not why Greek culture was "unhistorical," but rather why anyone should have proceeded from myth to history. Their traditional mythic understanding of the past, operating similarly to patterns of memory observable in other cultures, preserved relevant information (Le., that benefiting powerful elites) at the cost of massive loss of data, which appears to survive only in random fashion.
W. B. GALLIE, The Historical Understanding III, 149-202
The exercise of the capacity to follow stories, sequences of acceptable though not predictable incidents making for a promised though always open conclusion, constitutes historical understanding. Followable accounts of particular actions of individual men (the historian's main concern) must invoke institutional facts about societal life. The historian's task is not deductively to explain away aU apparent contingencies, which can be understood through their contributions to acceptable outcomes and are crucial to historical narratives. The scholar's reasoned emendation of a defective text, not scientific explanation, is the best model for historical explanations, which interrupt narrations to aid our story-following capacity when vision is blurred or credulity taxed. Huizinga never resolved his incompatible inclinations to view history as serious, scholarly, rational, intellectual and as playful, imaginative, aesthetic, and contemplative. The social aspects of the extra-scientific approach, which saw culture as an activity of the elite serving the noble and beautiful, account for Huizinga's aversion to the modern democratization of society in the larger role played by the masses, and in turn for his methodological errors: idealizing the past and treating the West, both non-totalitarian and totalitarian, as a single culture. Huizinga, blind to the economic and political realities from which he divorced culture, demanded renewed spiritual values rather than socio-political reform.
GERALD J. GRUMAN, "Balance" and "Excess" as Gibbon's Explanation of the Decline and Fall I, 75-85
Gibbon's explanation of the decline and fall consists in his applying to political phenomena the concepts of "balance" and "excess" which preoccupied the Whig aristocrat. For example, at its best foreign policy preserves the balance of power among nations. Excessive Roman domination led to cultural uniformity and mediocrity, which invited the barbarians. Scholars minimize the presence of a consistent causal explanation in Gibbon's wprk largely because of Gibbon's own inconsistencies in dating the beginning of the decline, and because Gibbon's account begins with the later Antonine period, whereas the excesses causing the decline and fall occurred in the late Republic.
11 BEN HALPERN, "Myth" and "Ideology" in Modem Usage I, 129-149
Popular and technical usages yield unequivocal definitions of "myth" and "ideology," terms which imply distinct meanings of "history" as both accumulated symbolic product and dynamic symbolic production. "Culture," the historical symbolic realm, is analyzable objectively as accumulation in terms of art, law, etc., or subjectively as dynamic process through mythology and ideology-the former dealing with beliefs originating in historical experience, value integration, and establishment of consensus, the latter with beliefs originating in competitive social situations and their communication and segregation. Irrational mythologies spark historical dynamism, rational ideologies extend it. Sorel, Mannheim, and other writers here examined use these distinctions systematically in historical interpretation. Meinecke and Hazard were wrong to suppose that the historical-mindedness peculiar to our culture was almost entirely a development from eighteenth-century thought. La Popeliniere, writing in 1599, already stated that historiography should describe "what actually happened," but also recognized the inevitable subjectivity of historians. His contemporaries Vignier and Pasquier rejected rhetoric in favor of research. Unhampered by the classicizing of the Italians, these French historians found in the idea of the nation a new perspective from which to judge the past. Freeing themselves from the chronology of the "four empires," they found-as would their nineteenth-century successors-that national history led to universal history. The development by Locke, Herder, and others of the concept of relative time, each time unit differing qualitatively and intrinsically according to the process of which it forms a part, bears on the nature of historical explanation. There is no universal time; the world "is" as it "appears" for every viewpoint; achievements of different periods, seemingly the same, differ by virtue of their contexts; phenomena are truly individualizable only through appraisal relative to these contexts which make explanation possible; even contemporary generations perceive a moment in different historical times; any of numerous different though equivalent descriptions can logically replace temporal statements.
GEORGE LICHTHEIM, Sartre, Marxism, and History III, 222-246
Sartre in Critique de fa raison diafectique, I, aspires to change the world by carrying Marxism to completion; yet his Marxism is an unresolved synthesis of Marx, Hegel, and Heidegger. The short introductory section contains most of its novel and fruitful ideas, and can be treated as the key to the work. It rests on the dialectic of being and consciousness (found in Marx but not in Engels' "dialectical materialism") which Sartre applies to the problem of mediation, so as to take account of the particularity of persons and events (regularly ignored by Marxism). Detouring into anthropology, Sartre presents rivalry for perpetually scarce food as the fundamental element of human life and proposes a Hobbesian political philosophy. Though his perception of "structures" and grasp of unique historical moments are less convincing than his insight into psychology, he shows that if "historicism" is pushed to its limit, it becomes a self-conscious philosophy which must be taken seriously.
GEORGE LICHTHEIM, The Concept of Ideology IV, Ambiguities in the concept of ideology may be clarified by a history of the word and the phenomenon. "Ideology" can mean both the consciousness of an epoch and the "false consciousness" of men unaware of their true historical position. It was coined in early nineteenth-century France for a "science of ideas," knowledge of which would assure harmonious social life (positivism inherits this view). For Hegel, ideology is the false consciousness necessarily arising from the partial and transitory nature of thought in its dialectical development. Marx, as a materialist, went further, holding all speculative thought to be ideological defense of the status quo; Nietzsche cynically reduced all thought to ideology. Weber, Lukacs, and Mannheim made a more creative critique. For Lukacs, the solution of the problem of ideology lay in the consciousness of the proletariate, the "identical subject-object" of history; for Mannheim, in that of the intellectuals. Laws through which we explain particular events need not be laws which describe uniform sequences of events; they may be laws stating uniform connections between two types of factor contained within a complex event. Hempel's apparent insistence that laws state the conditions invariably accompanying a type of complex event, that the event be an instance of the laws "covering" it, results from the Humean analysis in which causation obtains between types of events and "the cause" means necessary conditions. But historians often depict sufficient conditions. On the other hand, some knowledge of general laws is a presupposition of Dray's "continuous series" model of historical explanation.
INDEX TO VOLUMES I-V
MAURICE MANDELBAUM, The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy IV, Bei. 5, 33-66
The history of ideas deals with the elemental unit-ideas which for Lovejoy are components of systems distinguished by their patterns. Special histories explain how a particular form of human history developed. General histories draw on special histories to document or explain social contexts. Since patterns influence philosophers, the history of ideas contributes little to the history of philosophy, a discontinuous strand within a period's continuous intellectual history. By accepting cultural pluralism, denying the monistic position that there always are internal connections among all or some strands of intellectual and cultural history, both continuity and change in philosophy can be best understood. The view widely accepted among theologians that Greeks and Hebrews held different conceptions of time is based upon the absence in Hebrew of a' future tense and a specific word for time, and upon the claim that the Greeks conceived time as a cycle, the Hebrews as a line. None of these alleged evidences can survive examination. Moreover, whatever Greek philosophers thought about cyclical time, that view cannot be found in the historians. The real differences between Old Testament and Greek historiography lie in differing attitudes toward the continuity of events, kinds of evidence, the significance of remembering the past, and the relation of history and prophecy.
A. D. MOMIGLIANO, Vico's Scienza Nuova: Roman "Bestioni"
and Roman "Eroi" V, Vico, though deriving emotional support from the revival of Catholic scholarship, was intellectually isolated. He addressed himself to problems posed by Protestant and Jewish scholars two generations earlier. His interpretation of history was one of the most serious and profound attempts to re-establish the distinction between sacred and profane history, at the cost deemed excessive by his contemporaries of investing Homer and the XII Tables with the same authority as the Bible as records of human origins. His parallel between the Homeric poems and the XII Tables is strained, and his usual talents for misreading and misquotation are much-in evidence, but some of his intuitions (e.g., the "true Homer," the early Greek colony in Italy) showed brilliant insight. A system of language signs-predicate letters, constants, superscripts, subscripts, and two logical signs-is constructed for these sentences. This enables lexicographical ordering and hence machine-programming. Among the requirements of a descriptive history constituted of such sentences are that there be "quickly-decidable" sentences about individuals only and that statements involving belief, probability, or other modality be excluded. Examples of proper formulation are given, and the value of the rules and techniques of this extensional treatment of history-writing to actual history-writing is asserted.
GEORGE H. NADEL, History as Psychology in Francis Bacon's Theory of History V, [275] [276] [277] [278] [279] [280] [281] [282] [283] [284] [285] [286] [287] In assimilating the study of history to the study of natural science, Bacon emphasized the collection of historical facts and the need to induce general propositions from them. He indicated the psychological character of these propositions and claimed that historians were, and philosophers were not, competent to put moral and mental phenomena on a scientific basis. On the formal side, his theory of history was based on Aristotelian faculty psychology-history, the product of the mnemonic faculty, dealt with phenomena true to life. In intent, his theory was designed to reorient the study of moral philosophy away from rationalism toward an empirical or historical foundation and to emphasize involuntary as well as voluntary aspects of behavior.
GEORGE H. NADEL, Philosophy of History before Historicism III, 291-315
Philosophy of history before the nineteenth century was based on the classical theory of history. That theory, in justifying the purpose of historical studies, maintained that history was a storehouse of good and bad examples; was of particular use in educating statesmen, since it provided them with vicarious experience; and was a more compelling moral guide than the abstractions of philosophy. The unquestioned authority of Polybius and other ancient historians, as well as of the definitions of history by Pseudo-Dionysius (as "philosophy teaching by ex-amples") and Cicero (as "mistress of life"), perpetuated the exemplar theory. The rise of professional, academic historical study rendered it irrelevant; Bolingbroke was its last notable exponent.
• Weber made a fundamental contribution to Sinology despite ignorance of the language, reliance on limited sources, many factual mistakes, and the fundamental methodological error of using data separated by two or three millenia as evidence of a social structure falsely assumed to be unchanging. Weber saw the stability of Chinese society as resulting from a balance between the Emperor-with his instrument the bureaucracy-and local lineages and guilds. His ideal type of patrimonial bureaucracy leads to some distortion of the evidence, and his picture of the lineage is overdrawn; nevertheless he asks all the right questions and his concepts lead to a more profound knowledge of Chinese social history.
CHESTER G. STARR, Historical and Philosophical Time V, Bei. 6, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] Every historian has some attitude toward the speed and direction of human development, and this is the historian's concept of time. Historians should not be seduced by abstract chronology into assuming that time flows evenly; their task is to discern the swiftness or slowness, the advance or retrogression of the movement of events. The alleged difference between the "unhistorical" Greek conception of cyclical time and the "historical" No theory of revolution is complete without explaining counter-revolutions. Historians of the Vendee uprising have compiled evidence consonant with a "psychological" explanation style which directs our attention to motives of a few actors capable of conscious collective action; historiographical questions have been about motives and responsibility (almost in a legal sense). Thus sources giving direct accounts of the events and testimony of the participants' intentions have been exploited rather than the Vendee election records. This inhibits careful distinctions among the groups whose behavior is to be explained, and problems-such as ideology-not readily subsumed as "states of mind" disappear. Comparative analysis of states of mind being so difficult, the essential question why counter-revolution breaks out one place rather than another is omitted.
W. H. WALSH, Hegel on the History of Philosophy IV, Bei. 5, 67-82
Even though for Hegel the historian rethinks positions not as past but as necessary stages in his own philosophical development, the history of philosophy remains external to philosophy proper since a genius could work out from the beginning the stages in the Idea's progress. Hegel's critical history allocates space according to philosophical, not historical considerations, saying little about historical contexts. Non-Hegelians also emphasize assessment more than narration, and all historians of the arts and sciences must make judgments of both importance and value. The history of philosophy, however, has become more historical; assessment requires understanding a philosopher's meaning through his historical situation. Marxists misunderstand not only religous thought and artistic creativity, but even revolutionary ideology itself, since their narrow economic categories fit post-revolutionary periods. English Puritanism has often been distorted by a false identification with capitalism, though basically it was incompatible with capitalism or liberalism. Its covenant was unlike a contract because it expected sinful behavior, not good faith, and it institutionalized mutual surveillance. Puritan discipline is crucial. It tended to transform repression into self-control; only when reliable behavior could be taken for granted was Puritan fanaticism relaxed and Lockean liberalism born. We must understand the real concerns of Puritans (why did they choose a religion charged with anxiety? why did they fear and persecute witches?) They experienced exile, alienation, and social mobility, and chose Puritanism because it helped them organize these experiences into effective lives.
GERSHON WEILER, Fritz Mauthner as an Historian IV, 57-71
In addition to his critique of language, Mauthner wrote a four-volume History of Atheism. A radical skeptical empiricist, Mauthner held that there were no historical laws; yet there could be a craft of historical writing. Applying his idea that thinking and speaking are identical, Mauthner sought to show that the history of atheism is the gradual realization that "God" is only a word. However, the book appears to resemble the historiography of ideas a la Hegel more than Mauthner's theories should allow. This appearance is deceptive; Mauthner's History is not a true (i.e., scientifically valid) history of the development of an idea, but rather a personal recreation of the past, allowed by Mauthner's skeptical view of scientific methodology.
HAYDEN V. WHITE, The Burden of History V, 111-134
Claims by historians that history is both an art and a science are used to avoid the rigor appropriate to the sciences and to remain blind to the imaginative innovations characteristic of modern art. (This may explain why so many plays and novels of the past century represent historians as the most deadly enemies of sensibility.) Few modern historians have approached the intellectual courage of Burckhardt's "impressionist" view of the Renaissance; yet such courage even to contemplate the dissolution of historiography as we now know it-is required before artists and scientists will be willing to take history seriously.
